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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

TRANSPOWER MANUFACTURING, INC.,:
a Utah corporation, and BEN V.
HELSTEN, an individual,
PlaintiffsRespondents,

Supreme Court No. 19214

vs.
FREE-WING TURBINE CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, and LAIRD
B. GOGINS, an individual,
DefendantsAppellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a "judgment by confession" entered
against the defendants Free-Wing Turbine Corporation and Laird
B. Gogins (hereinafter referred to collectively as the
"Defendants") without the filing of a complaint, without
issuance or service of process and without hearing.

Judgment

was entered against the defendants as makers of a promissory
note upon ex parte application to the court by Ben V. Helsten
and Transpower Manufacturing (hereinafter referred to
collectively as the "Plaintiffs").

-1-

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judgment was entered against the defendants upon
parte application of the plaintiff on March 3, 1983.
7, 1983, as

s~on

~

On April

as possible after learning of the entry of the

judgment, plaintiffs moved to set aside the judgment pursuant
to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendants' motion was heard by the Honorable Judith Billings
of the Third District Court on April 14,

1983.

The court

dictated its order and its findings into the record at that
time and directed plaintiffs' counsel to prepare an order for
the file.
1983.

This order was signed by the court on April 22,

Pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the

District Courts, the defendant objected to the form of. the
order prepared by plaintiffs' counsel and defendants'
objections were heard and sustained by the court on May 6,
1983.

As a result of the courts ruling of May 6, the parties

stipulated to amend the judgment and the amended judgment was
entered on May 12, 1983.
Appeal on May 11, 1983.

Defendants filed their Notice of
Defendants appeal the judgment entered

on March 3, 1983, and the amendments thereto entered on May 12,
1983, as well as the lower courts denial of their motion to set
aside the judgment.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
First and foremost, defendants seek an order vacating
the judgment entered against them below.
-2-

They also ask for an

,r,jer that Judgment cannot be entered against them on the note
which is the subJect of this lawsuit without the filing of a
r·.>mplaint, and the issuance and service of process to which
defendants shall be given the customary right to respond.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Due to the nature of a judgment by confession it is
difficult to make citations to the record as is required by
Rule 75(p)(2)(d).

Though defendants' counsel suggested the

court should allow an evidentiary hearing on any defenses
Jefendants might have before their motion to set aside the
Judgment was denied (T. 16), none was given.

It is therefore

difficult to cite to the record regarding the facts; but,
counsel believes the following is a fair statement of the
background facts.
Laird Gogins is the developer of a device known as the
Free-Wing Turbine.
power from the wind.

This is a device which generates electrical
Free-Turbine Corporation, a Utah

corporation in which Laird Gogins is the principal stockholder,
entered into a sales license agreement and license agreement
with the plaintiff, Ben Helsten, to market these devices.

It

is defendants' understanding that Ben Helsten is a principal in
franspower Manufacturing Inc. and Transpower Manufacturing is
11e entity through which Ben Helsten is marketing these devices.
Disputes subsequently arose between the parties as to
wno was indebted to whom and in what amounts under the terms of
-3-
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Manuf"l.cturing,

Inc. and Ben V. Helsten, Civil No. C83-3001.

Plaintiffs'

counsel indicated that one of these lawsuits had been filed at
the time of the hearing on defendants'
judgment (T. 26).

motion to set aside the

It is anticipated that these lawsuits will

be consolidated for trial.

In these lawsuits,

the parties ask

for judgment against one another for sums in excess of
$1,000,000.
Under the judgment in this case, plaintiffs have
attempted to execute on the interest Laird B. Gogins has in
Free-Wing Turbine Corporation and, thereby, gain control of
Free-Wing Turbine Corporation.

Had this been accomplished,

plaintiffs could have summarily short-circuited a large part of
the other two lawsuits.

Execution has been prevented only by

posting the stock of Laird B. Gogins in Free-Wing Turbine
Corporation as part of the supersedeas bond.

If defendants

lose on appeal, the stock may be forfeited and the other
lawsuits may still be disposed of quickly by plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION WAS NOT ENTERED
PURSUANT TO STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.

Judgment by confession finds statutory authorization
in Utah in Utah Code Annotated §

78~22-3

which reads as follows:

A judgment by confession may be entered
without action, either for money due or to

-6-

become due or secure any person against
contingent liability on behalf of the
defendant or both, in the manner prescribed
by law.
Such judgment may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction for like amounts.
The "manner prescribed by law'' is found in Rule 58
A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads as
follows:
(E) Judgment by confession. Whenever
judgment by confession is authorized by
statute, the party seeking the same must
file with the clerk of the court in which
the judgment is to be entered a statement,
verified by the defendant to the following
effect;
(1)
if the judgment to be confessed is for
money due or to become due, it shall
concisely state the claim and that the sum
confessed therefore is justly due or to
become due;
(2)
if the judgment to be confessed is for
the purpose of securing the plaintiff
against a contingent liability, it must
state concisely the claim and that the sum
confessed therefore does not exceed the same;
(3)
it must authorize the entry of judgment
for a specified sum.
The Clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the
statement and enter in the judgment docket,
a judgment of the court for the amount
confessed, with cost of entry, if any.
Having recognized the harsh and overbearing nature of
the remedy of

judgment by confession, the Utah Court has held

-7-

that strict compliance with the law and the rules must be
adhered to or any attempted confession of judgment is

vo1~.

Bacon v. Raybould, 4 Utah 357, 10 P. 481, aff'd £.1:1_ rehearing, 4
Utah 357, 11 P. 510 (1886); Utah National Bank v. Sears, 13
Utah 172, 44 P. 832 (1896); and Utah Association of Credit Men
v. Jones, 49 Utah 519, 164 P. 1029 (1917).

If the judgment is

not entered in strict accordance with the statutory provisions,
it is void:
it has been uniformly held that a judgment
by confession must conform strictly to the
statute and can exist only by statutory
authority.
This court long ago maintained
the doctrine that a judgment by confession,
obtained in any other manner than that
directed by our statutes is null and
void .
Utah National Bank v. Sears, 44 P. at 832-33.
A.

The ''Verified Statement For Judgment by Confession"
Proferred b the Plaintiffs Did Not Meet The
Requirements of Rule SSA e).
An examination of the record will reveal a document

entitled "Verified Statement For Judgment by Confession" dated
March 2, 1983, and filed with the Clerk of Court on March 2,
1983, at 4:49 P.M.

One has to presume that this document was

intended by the plaintiffs to meet the requirements of 58A(e).
The title of the document alone should force one to conclude
this.

However, an examination of this document will reveal it

-8-

s

111~t

:i

verified statement "by the defendant" at all;

it is a

1er1f1ed statement of the plaintiffs and therefore it does not
meet the requirements of Rule 58A(e).
No one but the defendants could execute the verified
statement required for a judgment by confession.

Consider Utah

National Bank v. Sears, 13 Utah 172, 44 P. 832 (1886).

That

case involved a promissory note which contained a warrant
dUthorizing any attorney who was duly admitted to the bar of
the United States or of any state to appear in any court and
confess judgment against the maker of the note.

A judgment was

entered upon the verified statement of an attorney pursuant to
che provisions of the Note but was set aside upon motion of the
defendant.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah stated:

The sole contention in
is, can such a warrant
in this case authorize
enter judgment against

*

*

this case, as we view it,
of attorney as is involved
the creditor himself to
his debtor?

*

We think the parties cannot, either by signature
of one or by the signature of all to any kind of
contract, vary the rules of procedure of courts
expressly established by the Code. The only
method of obtaining a judgment by confession in
this state is the one pointed out by our statute.
Comp. Laws §§ 3767-3770.
The very object of
enacting the Code was to confine parties, so far
as legal procedure is concerned, to the method
prescribed in the Code. Any defect in the
proceeding, or material departure from the
statutory provisions, would render a judgment
absolutely void.
lj.

at 832-33.

The Court required strict statutory compliance

clnd held that there must be a verified statement by the debtor
-9-

himself and affirmed the lower court's vacation of the
judgment.

1

Judgment by confession was then governed by ~~ 3767,
l
3768, 3769 and 3770 of the Compiled Laws of Utah 1888. As
counsel pointed out below, these previous statutes do not
differ from the current statues in any material way.
They read
as follows:
Sec. 3767. A judgment by confession may be entered without action, either for money due or to become due or
secure any person against contingent liability on behalf
of the defendant, or both, in the manner prescribed by
this chapter.
Such judgment may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction for like amounts.
Sec. 3768.
A statement in writing must be made, signed
by the defendant and verified by his oath to the
following effect:
(1)
It must authorize the entry of judgment for a
specified sum.
(2)
If it be for money due, or to become due, it must
state concisely the facts out of which it arose, and
show that the sum confessed therefor is justly due or to
become due;
(3)
If it be for the purpose of securing the plaintiff
against a contingent liability, it must state concisely
the facts constituting the liability, and show the sum
confessed therefor does not exceed the same.
Sec. 3769.
The statement must be filed with the clerk
of the court in which the judgment is to be entered, who
must endorse upon it, and enter in the judgment book, a
judgment of such court for the amount confessed, with
five dollars cost.
The statement and affidavit with the
judgment endorsed, thereupon, becomes the judgment roll.
Sec. 3770.
In a justice's court, where the court has
the authority to enter the judgment, the statement may
be filed with the justice, who must thereupon enter his
docket a judgment of his court for the amount confessed,
with three dollars cost.
If a transcript of such
judgment filed with the district clerk, a copy of the
statement must be filed with it.
-10-

B.

The Promissor Note Itself Does Not Meet
The Requirements of Rule 58 A e).

Once these obvious deficiencies were pointed out to
Lhe court below,

the court, on its own motion,

inquired whether

or not the note itself was verified and signed by the

Jefendants.

Plaintiffs'

counsel volunteered a statement that

the note was verified while defendants' counsel offered that it
was only notarized and even if it was verified it did not
contain the statements required by Rule 58A(e).
Thereafter,

(T. 17).

the court made the following finding:

Court finds that the note itself which was
executed by the defendant and was verified
and thus complies with the provisions of
Rule 58 A(e), sworn to by him, and it has
the sum certain which will be due under
certain conditions as set out in the note.
(T. 31).
IT.

31).

See also Paragraph 2 of that order of the court

denying defendants' motion to set aside the judgment.
An examination of the note itself will reveal it was
not sworn and not verified by the defendants.

The makers of

the note simply acknowledged before a notary public that they,
in fact,

executed the note.

2

2
The promissory note is dated February 27, 1983, and
was filed with the clerks office on March 3, 1983, at 4:45 P.M.

-11-

Furthermore, even if the note were verified,
not meet the requirements of Rule 58A{e).

it would

The note does not

indicate that any sum is "justly'' due or to become due nor does
it concisely state the claim giving rise to any "continyent
liability''.

Nor, does it "authorize the entry of judgment for

a specified sum" unless "the amount of principle,

interest and

other cost incurred in obtaining said judgment" is a specified
sum.
Even if the note did meet the requirements of Rule
58A(e),

judgment would still not have been entered in

accordance with the provisions of Rule 58A(e).
itself was filed March 3, 1983, at 3:20 P.M.

The judgment
The note was

filed March 3, 1983, at 4:45 P.M. - after the judyment by
confession.

Rule 58A(e) specifies that the judgment will be

filed upon presentation of the verified statement.
clearly did not take place.
judgment was filed.

This

The note was filed well after the

It also does not appear that the clerk (or

the judge) "endorsed upon the statement .

. a judgment of the

court for the amount confessed" as is required by Rule 58A(e).
II.

THE JUDGMENT IS VOID BECAUSE IT DENIED DEFENDANTS
THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED
BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
It is well settled that people have due process rights

to notice and hearing prior to civil adjudications.

-12-

However,

1t is equally clear that such due process rights are subject to
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated "due

waiver.

process rights of notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment
are subject to waiver".

D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405

U.S. 174, 31 L. Ed. 2d 124, 133, 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972).

See

also, Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 31 L. Ed. 2d 138, 92
Ct.

767,

s.

reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1049, 31 L. Ed. 2d 592, 92

S. Ct. 1303 (1972).
As defendants counsel pointed out to the lower court,
the United States Supreme Court has not clearly ruled on the
standard by which waiver of these due process rights is to be
determined.

(T. 15-16).

Nevertheless,

in Overmyer, supra, two

iustices - Douglas and Marshall - out of a seven justice
court

3

indicated that the standard for waiver of due process

rights in the civil context was the same as in criminal cases:
"it must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made"; "an
intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege".

The

0ther 5 participating justices gave no clear ruling on what the
standard was but stated:
Even if for present purposes, we assume that
the standard for waiver in a corporate
property right case of its kind is the same
standard applicable to waiver in a criminal

3

Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate.

-13-

proceeding, that is, that it be voluntary,
knowingly and intelligently made. (citations
omitted), 'an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege',
(citations omitted), and even if as the
court has said in the civl area, 'we do not
presume acquiescence', (citations omitted),
the standard was fully satisfied here.
31 L. Ed. 2d at 134.
Despite the absence of a clear ruling by the Supreme
Court,

it appears the lower federal courts all express the view

that the standard for waiver of due process rights in the civil
context is the same as in criminal cases:
While the United States Supreme Court has
not yet authoritatively decided whether the
same waiver or standard applies in civil
cases as in criminal cases, the lower
federal courts have universally applied the
same standard.
See, ~· Gonzalez v.
County of Hidalgo, Texas, 489 F.2d 1043,
1046, (5th Cir. 1973); American Consumer,
Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 427 F.
Supp. 591 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Thus, in order
to waive a right, there must be an
intentional relinquishment of a known right
or privilege.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 404, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L. Ed 2d
424 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464, 58 S. Ct. 1049, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461
( 1938).
Hernandez v. Casillas, 520 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Tex. 1981).

See

also, Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 94
(5th Cir. 1981); Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D.
Minn. 1976); Garner v. Tri-State Development Co.,
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382 F. Supp.

Jal

(E.D. Mich.

The same views have been expressed by state supreme

ui.ses.

Telephonic Inc. v. Rosenbloom, 88 N.M. 532, 543 P.2d

~ourts.

825

(

1974) and other authorities cited in these

1976).
In determining whether or not a waiver has taken

pl~ce,

courts consider all the surrounding facts and

circumstances including the relative bargaining position of the
parties,

the sophistication of the parties and whether or not

the waiver was specifically bargained for.
Furthermore:
The Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Sheven,
(citation omitted), and in numerous other
cases, (footnote omitted) has clearly
indicated that a heavy burden must be born
by the party claiming that a 'voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing' contractual waiver
has occurred
Gonzalez v. County of Hidalgo, Texas, 489 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th
Cir. 1973).

As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in

Mosley v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 634 F.2d 942, 946
!oth Cir. 1981):
Courts,
'indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver'. Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Kennecy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S. Ct. 89,
812, 81 L. Ed. 1177 (1937) to be effective,
a waiver 'not only must be voluntary but
must be knowing, intelligent, (and) done
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with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances anu likely consequences.'
Brady v. Maryland,
Ct. 1463,

397 U.S.

382 F.

cases cited therein.

7-tti,

20 L.

t:d.

2c!

747,

9u s.

See also, Garner v. Tri-State

1469 (1970).

Development Co.,

742,

Supp.

377,

380-81

(l::.D. '1ich.

and

197.+)

The buruen of proof for establishing that

a waiver took place falls on the party asserting the waiver.
Even if a party effectively waives this right:
Constitutional due process requires that a
judicial determination of waiver must
preceed entry of judgment.
Osmond v.
Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124, 127 (D. Del. 1972).
The most current line of cases involving
cognovit notes holds that, even in the
context of a clear waiver of notice and
opportunity to be heard, there must be a
judicial determination as to whether the
waiver was voluntary before judgment can be
entered.
See Virgin Island National Bank v.
Tropical Ventures Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1203,
1205 (D.R.I. 1973); Osmond v. Spence, 359 F.
Supp. 124, 127 (D. Del. 1972); Scott v.
Danaher, 343, F. Supp. 1272, 1278 (N.D. 111.
1972); but see Tunheim v. Bowman, 366 F.
Supp. 1392,~94 (D. Nev. 1972).
Hernandez v. Casillas,

52'.J F.

Supp.

389,

393

(S.D. Tex 1981).

As the court stated in Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124,
( D. Del.

l 9 7 2) :
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Since a signed cognovit note does not
constitute proof of an effective waiver, a
hearing and judicial determination are
necessary, and an understanding and
voluntary waiver must be shown prior to
entry of judgment.
Unless a hearing is
conducted on the waiver question before the
judgment is entered, an alleged debtor will
be deprived of his due process rights on
every occasion when an effective waiver had
not occurred upon the initial execution of
the note.
(Emphasis added).
Given this information, one may well conclude not only
that the entry of judgment in this case was unconstitutional,
but that the Utah provisions governing confession of judgment
are unconstitutional on their face.

The Utah provisions allow

Judgment to be entered by the clerk without ever consulting a
JUdge.

4

This certainly does not allow for a judicial

Jetermination of waiver prior to the entry of judgment.

Unless

Rule SSA(e) is read to require a verified statement signed by
the actual debtor, these provisions most certainly are
~nconstitutional:

judgment could be entered with no evidence

that a waiver has taken place.
The record in this case clearly reveals that no
nearing was held prior to the entry of judgment to determine

4
Counsel does not wish to mislead the Court: judgment
this case was entered by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of
the Third District Court.
Nevertheless if entered pursuant to
• statute which is unconstitutional on its face, the judgment
in this case should be void.
1'1
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whether or not the defendants in this case had waived their
right to due process.

The only thing in the record that would

remotely suggest that defendants had waived this right is the

.

promissory note executed by the defendants.

This promissory

note was not even filed until after the judgment had been
entered!

Clearly then, there was no judicial determination

that a knowing and voluntary waiver had taken place prior to
the entry of judgment as is required by the United States
Constitution.

There was certainly no evidence on which a court

could have based such a conclusion.
The uncontroverted affidavit of Laird Gogins indicates
that his prior counsel informed him judgment could not be taken
against him or Free-Wing Turbine without the issuance of
process and notice and hearing.

There was virtually no

evidence before the court to suggest that defendants'

right to

procedural due process was a known right which was
deliberately, knowingly and intelligently waived.
It is well established that a conviction of a criminal
defendant entered upon his or her guilty plea is
unconstitutional if the guilty plea is entered upon misleading
advice of counsel.

This is because a guilty plea which is

entered on advice of counsel is not a voluntary and intelligent
waiver of the defendants due process rights to trial by his
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reers, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc.,
wds misled by his attorney.
759,

if the defendant

McMann v. Richardson,

397 U.S.

25 L. Ed 2d 763, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970); Pedicord v.

Swenson,

304 F. Supp 393 (W.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 92

(8th Cir. 1970).

There is nothing in the record which

controverts the affidavit of Laird Gogins which indicates that
his previous counsel advised that no judgment could be taken
against defendants without notice and hearing.

The case law

makes it clear that there could have been no valid waiver of
iefendants due process rights in such circumstances.
Nevertheless,

the lower court found the defendants

understanding that the judgment could not be taken against them
without notice and hearing was nothing more than a "unilateral
mistake of law" which did not justify lifting the judgment.
III.

5

THE JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION DENIED DEFENDANTS THEIR
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED
BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
The right to due process of law is guaranteed in the

Constitution of the State of Utah in Article l, Sections 7 and
11.

Section 7 states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.

5
(T. 32); Paragraph 5 of the courts order denying
defendants to set aside the judgment.
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Section 11 states:
All courts shall be open and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this state, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.
(Emphasis Added).
Both of these provisions underscore the basic notion
that people are entitled to their day in court before a
judgment allowing others to deprive them of their property may
be entered against them.

The entry of judgment without notice

and hearing is violative of the most basic and fundamental
rights recognized by Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Defendants can find no decision of this court
indicating whether or not this state constitutional right can
be waived.

However,

it seems reasonable to believe that almost

any right can be waived in the proper circumstances.

The

appropriate question is by what standard do we determine
whether or not such a waiver has taken place.

Defendants

suggested to the lower court and suggest to this Court as well
that waiving these state due process rights is at least as
difficult as is the waiving of federal due process rights.
Defendants urge this court to rule that a judicial
determination that a waiver has taken place must be made before
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, Judgment by confession can be entered and that a presumption
exists that no such waiver has taken place and that the burden
of proof regarding a waiver lies with the party asserting the
waiver.

If the court adopts this standard, the judgment

against the defendants must fall.

There was no judicial

determination that a waiver had taken place prior to the entry
of judgment in this case.

Furthermore, the uncontroverted

Affidavit of Laird Gogins indicates that he and Free-Wing
Turbin Corp. clearly did not know and comprehend that they were
waiving their rights to notice and hearing.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
RULE 60(b)(7) MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
The record below clearly reveals that defendant sought
to have the judgment set aside under Rule 60(b)(7) even if the
court had determined that it had been legally and
constitutionally entered. (T. 3, 4, 19, 20, 32).

Rule 60(b) ( 7)

reads as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order or proceeding
for the following reasons: • • . (7) Any
other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.
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Defendants submit that the nature of the judgment in
this case together with the facts and circumstances surrounding
the case clearly indicate that it is in the interest of justice
to lift the judgment.

The judgment grows out of a factual

situation which has led to two more lawsuits involving these
parties wherein both sides pray for judgment against the other
for sums in excess of Sl,000,000.

The note on which the

judgment was entered and the agreement that went along with the
note are connected and wound up inextricably in the other
proceedings.

The doctrine of compulsory joinder of claims

dictates that any claims plaintiffs have on the note should be
joined with the other claims plaintiffs have asserted in the
other litigation.

Defendants have asserted claims against

plaintiffs in the other litigation which by all right should
have been compulsory counterclaims in this action and would
have been brought in this action had defendants been given the
opportunity to do so.

Furthermore, if plaintiffs are allowed

to acquire the stock of Laird B. Gogins in defendant Free-Wing
Turbine Corp. by virtue of the judgment in this case, they
would have a controlling interest in Free-Wing Turbine Corp.
and could cause numerous actions against plaintiffs in the
other two lawsuits to be summarily dismissed.
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Before the lower court, the defendants suggested that
confession of judgment should be set aside at least as easily
6
as a default judgment.
The Affidavit of Laird Gogins
~

indicates that he has defenses to the action on the note and
claims against plaintiffs which are in the nature of compulsory
counterclaims.

This certainly would be grounds for setting

aside a default judgment.

If it is grounds for setting aside a

default judgment, it ought to be grounds for setting aside a
Judgment by confession because defendants in this case did not
even have the opportunity to answer a complaint after process
had issued and they had been duly served.
Farseeing the possibility that the court might not
adopt the same standard for setting aside judgments by
confession as for

judgments by default, defendant's counsel

discussed other possible standards.

At least one court held

that judgments by confession should be set aside if the
judgment debtor can present evidence sufficient to withstand a
Livingston v. Rebman, 169 Ohio

motion for a directed verdict.
St. 104, 158 N.E.2d 366 (1959).
this standard was too high.

Defendant's counsel urged that

Of course, defendants urge that

such a judgment should be set aside in the same circumstances

6
See defendant's memorandum of points and
'uthorities in support of their motion to lift the judgment.
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as a default judgment; such judgment should be set aside even
more easily.

Below, plaintiff's counsel volunteered that this

was the case in Colorado.

(T. 24).

In the event the Court

fails to adopt that standard, defendants urge that the
presentation of evidence on which a motion for summary judgment
could not be granted should cause a court to set such a
judgment aside.
Below, defendant's counsel and defendant's affidavit
indicated that defendants believe that they have defenses and
that defendants at least ought to be entitled to an evidentiary
hearing regarding those defenses before their motion could can
be denied.

(T. 19).

No evidentiary hearing was had and

defendant's motion was denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendants submit that it is clear judgment was not
entered in this case in accordance with the applicable statutes
and that for a judgment by confession to stand the statutes
must be strictly adhered to.

It is equally clear that the

entry of judgment in this case denied defendants their right to
due process of law as guaranteed by both the United States
Constitution and the Utah Constitution.

The surrounding facts

and circumstances also justify the lifting of the judgment in
this case and having the merits adjudicated in related
proceedings.

For these reasons, defendants pray that the Court
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9~cate

the judgment entered against them in this case and

[.1rther direct that defendants be given their day in court
before any judgment may be entered against them.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

~-

day of July, 1983.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By

,, {J veil '{'£M---l"'(
Duke F. Wahlquist
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Paul Franklin Farr, Esq.
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